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The recent trial of 'Big Spender'Cheung Tze-keung and his gang,
and the looming trial of Li Yuhui, the
suspected Telford Gardens murderer,
have both generated intense discussion
on the necessity and possibilities of a
formal rendition arrangement between
Hong Kong and the Mainland.
The Basic Law and Hong
Kong's New Legal Sovereignty
The creation of the Hong Kong Special
Administration Region under the 'One
Country, Two Systems' doctrine has
fundamentally changed the division
of jurisdictions in the PRC unitary state
and calls for a reinterpretation of
jurisdictional matters within the new
constitutional context. There are, under
a single PRC political sovereignty, two
legal sovereignties or jurisdictions.
Each of them is independent of each
other and equal to the other. Each
jurisdiction has its own laws and legal
system supported by its own unique
political economy and legal culture.
Moreover, there is no truly concurrent
central jurisdiction of the sort one finds
in a federal system. There are thus two
different criminal laws in China. In
practice, it is clear that the criminal
law of the PRC can only be a Mainland
law in spite of the fact that, like many
other Mainland laws, it states that it
applies in the PRC to all Chinese
citizens. Hong Kong, as a Special
Administrative Region, is not part of
the 'legal territory' of the PRC within
the meaning of Mainland criminal law.
Regional conflict of law problems
have been the subject of academic
studies in the Mainland over the last
decade. The solutions to these
problems need to be based upon
residence rather than nationality. The
PRC citizenry is composed of residents
from the Mainland and the Special
Administrative Regions. However, for
all practical purposes, what counts is
not whether one is a PRC citizen, but
what kind of PRC citizen one is. An
SAR resident, while being a PRC
citizen, is still primarily an SAR
resident. He or she, in principle, should
have no duty to abide by PRC criminal
law while he or she is not in the
Mainland. Since the application of PRC
criminal law is intended to be limited
to the Mainland and its residents, 'PRC
citizen' within the meaning of PRC
criminal law ought not to include an
SAR resident.
The Basic Law protects Hong
Kong's legal system from any possible
Mainland intrusion by conferring
upon it an equal status to that of the
Mainland, no less and no more.
Importantly, it does not confer any
primary rights on either system. The
'One Country, Two Systems' doctrine
separates the jurisdictions, while still
allowing them to negotiate on how
they should interact. This arrangement
does not create any positive or
affirmative powers on one system as
opposed to the other. It simply
recognises their equal status without
d e p r i v i n g either system of its
jurisdiction according to its own law.
Mutual Legal Assistance
between Jurisdictions
The degree to which d i f f e r e n t
jurisdictions assist one another in
criminal law matters varies. There is a
wide spectrum of legal interaction
between any two systems, and the
exact location in the spectrum where
their interaction takes place depends
on a variety of factors. The most
important among them are the nature
of their political systems, the law and
legal systems that apply, confidence
and trust in each other's systems, and
above all, the practical necessity of
dealing with each other. The more
inherently different their political and
legal systems, the less confidence one
system will have in the other and the
more difficult it will be for the parties
to co-operate with each other. Given
the fundamental differences between
the political and legal systems in the
Mainland and Hong Kong, the
conclusion and operation of a rendition
agreement is bound to be a difficult
and tortuous process.
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International practice has shown
that where two systems share the same
pol i t ica l t radi t ion and have full
confidence in the fairness and
effectiveness of the other's system, the
two parlies tend to co-operate freely,
fu l ly and mostly impor tan t ly ,
informally. On the other hand, where
one parly has no confidence in the
fairness and effectiveness of the other
party's system, the co-operation
between the two tends to be formal
and partial. Any agreement will have
to be carefully negotiated with a clearly
delineated scope of rights and
obligations.
Typically, the party with the
stronger bargaining power prefers a
flexible approach and seeks to deal
w i t h i s s u e s i n f o r m a l l y o r
administratively. That is, to use Lu
Ping's words, the Mainland's
preference is to handle the issue on a
'case-by-case basis'. The weaker party,
on the other hand, tends to prefer a
carefully written agreement with its
terms 'cast in stone', to use the words
of the DPP in Hong Kong. It is to the
benefit of the weaker party to insist on
formality and regularity. It is clear that
the SAR government needs to reach
an agreement with the Mainland on
both jurisdictional matters and matters
concerning the rendition of criminal
suspects. Such an agreement should
be formalised, with specific obligations
and equally specific exceptions.
China's International
Extradition Regime
China signed its first extradition
agreement in 1993 with Thailand. By
1998 C h i n a had entered into
extradition agreements with seven
c o u n t r i e s : Belarus, Bu lga r i a ,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Romania, the
Russian Federation and Thailand. The
structure and substance of each of the
agreements are the same or very
similar.
There are a number of restrictions
on extradition, which are expressly
provided for in the treaties China has
entered into. One of them is the
political offence exception. This
exception remains a 'hot issue' in
extradition law, but it has been
expressly accepted by China. Under
the treaties signed by China, a political
offence is a bar to extradition to or
from China. As it happens, counter-
revolutionary offences have been
replaced by offences endangering state
security in China's 1997 Criminal Law
Amendment, partly for the purpose of
strengthening China's co-operation
with the international community in
extradition and other criminal matters.
Another important exception
relates to the extradition of nationals.
Following the civil law tradition, China
refuses to extradite its own nationals
to a foreign country to face criminal
trial. Correspondingly, China will not
request a foreign national to be
extradited to the Mainland to face a
criminal trial. It should be noted that,
within the meaning of these treaties, it
is c lear tha t China means the
Mainland, and Chinese national means
Mainland resident.
The death penalty has proven to
be the most controversial issue during
treaty negotiations. All foreign parries
involved in such treaties with China
have insisted on making the possible
application of the death penalty a bar
to extradition in the agreements.
China's position, however, has
consistently been firm in excluding the
death penalty f rom the list of
exceptions to extradition.
While China has been consistent in
ensuring that the death penalty
exception is not stated in the treaties,
it has nonetheless been flexible in
a c c e p t i n g o ther less f o r m a l
mechanisms to facilitate the demands
of foreign parties to control the use of
the death penalty. In other words,
although China has rejected the death
penalty exception in the treatises, at
the same time it has been willing to
give assurances at a less formal level
that the death penalty would not be
applied after extradition. China has
agreed to compromise its position as
long as the death penalty is not stated
as a formal bar to extradition. A treaty
can be silent on the death penalty
exception but still state that an
extradition request should be rejected
if the extradition contravenes the legal
provisions of the requested party. The
treaty with Russia follows this model.
Alternatively, the parties can make a
separate statement declaring that,
where the offence for which
extradition is requested is punishable
by death under the law of the
requesting country, the requesting
party shall respect the law of the
requested party and both parties shall
negot ia te a solut ion mu tua l ly
acceptable. The extradition treaties
with Belarus and Romania follow this
model.
Where extradition is achieved
through negotiation without a treaty,
whether the extradited suspect can be
sentenced to death depends upon the
position of the requested country and
subsequent negotiations. A few
suspects have been extradited to the
Mainland from some East Asian and
South East Asian countries without the
assistance of treaties and some of them
have been sentenced to death. One
notable exception is a hijacker
extradited from Japan in 1989. The
suspect was extradited without the
assistance of a treaty. He was
sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment —
very lenient by Chinese standards. The
lenient sentence was said to have been
a pre-condition imposed by the
Japanese authorities in return for the
extradition.
Rendition of Criminal
Suspects between the
Mainland and Taiwan
The Mainland has been able to reach a
rendition agreement with Taiwan for
the transfer of illegal immigrants and
criminal suspects. For very obvious
reasons, the Mainland does not have a
treaty with Taiwan but the rendition
agreement deals with much the same
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issues as the formal extradition treaties
China has signed. The Taiwan
experience provides an example,
which Hong Kong may refer to as a
basis for determining the nature and
scope of a local rendition agreement
with the Mainland.
In 1990, the Red Cross Associations
from both sides of the Taiwan Straits,
which have been used from time to
time as informal representatives of the
two governments for the purpose of
making contact, reached a landmark
agreement on the Island of Quemoy,
referred to as the Quemoy Agreement
(the Agreement). It is a short rendition
agreement, which stipulates the
principles, locations and procedures
of rendition and the offenders to whom
the Agreemen t a p p l i e s . The
Agreement states that 'humanitarian
spirit' and 'safety and convenience' are
the guiding principles. It is applicable
to criminal suspects, convicted
offenders and illegal immigrants.
The operation of the Agreement
proved successful in the two years
following its implementation. Several
groups of illegal immigrants were sent
back to the Mainland and a few high
profile criminal suspects were returned
to the Mainland to face trial. However,
problems began to surface when both
sides had to deal with the issue of
aircraft hijacking from Mainland to
Taiwan. A crucial issue related to the
scope of the Agreement: did the
Agreement apply to the offence of
hijacking or not?
Direct dialogue between Taiwan
and the Mainland took place in
Singapore in April 1993. These
negotiations were conducted by two
newly established non-governmental
organisa t ions f rom each side
respectively. Represent ing the
Mainland was the Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
(ARATS). Representing Taiwan was
the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF).
In negotiating the matter of hijacking
and the possible rendition of hijackers,
Taiwan insisted on exercising
jurisdiction over the offence of
hijacking on the grounds that such
offences took place in both places and
thus, under international law, Taiwan
was entitled to prosecute. The Quemoy
Agreement, according to Taiwan, was
not specific on what crimes were
covered and because of the political
significance of hijacking and Taiwan's
concern over its jurisdiction, the
rendition of hijackers had to be treated
differently. It was said that there
should be a formal agreement before
there could be rendition. In essence,
Taiwan was demanding that the
Mainland recognise its lawful
jurisdiction in criminal matters.
Taiwan further insisted that, in any
future rendition agreement, a suspect
would not be returned if the offence
concerned was pol i t ica l , was
punishable by death, the case was in
judicial process, or the offender was a
Taiwanese 'citizen'.
After tense negotiations, a tentative
agreement was reached in August
1994, which has yet to be approved by
Taipei and Beijing. It is clear, however,
that the Mainland has made major
concessions. The new agreement was
o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d to be
supplementary to the Quemoy
Agreement, with a narrow focus on
the offence of hijacking. But, at the
ins i s t ence of T a i w a n , the
supplementary agreement on the
rendition of hijackers is also made
applicable to all other offences, thus
effectively replacing the Quemoy
Agreement. According to the new
agreement, there will be no express
'political offence exception', but the
requested party is allowed to refuse a
rendition request if, in 'special
circumstances', the offence is 'closely
related' to the requested party or its
'interest is seriously affected' by the
offence. Otherwise, the party holding
the suspect will surrender the suspect
after appropriate investigation. It
appears that the new agreement, even
though it has not been approved, is in
actuality governing the rendition of
suspects across the Taiwan Straits.
Another major concession made by
the Main land re la tes to the
'extradition' of 'citizens' from one side
to the other to face criminal trial. While
both sides have agreed that the 'citizen
exception' should not be referred to in
the agreement, they nevertheless
agreed that the requested party has
the right to determine whether its
'citizens' should be 'extradited' to the
other side.
One Country as Form,
Two Countries as Substance
The key to interaction between two
legal systems is not state sovereignty
but the independence of each system.
That is, the legal sovereignty of each
system. Hong Kong is clearly within
the 'One Country' and this is simply
no longer an issue. How the 'Two
Systems' can survive, and how they
should interact, is the overriding
question. The substance of mutual
legal assistance in general, and
extradition — or rendit ion — in
particular, in a domestic context is not
necessarily different from that in an
international context. Such assistance
will be the subject of an agreement
between two jurisdictions arrived at
through a process of negotiation and
agreed upon by both parties. There is
no inherent substance in any
extradition agreement, international or
otherwise. The substance is negotiable
depending upon necessity and the
parties' political will and political skill.
No one party should impose its will
on the other. The Mainland's rendition
agreement with Taiwan is not in
subs tance d i f f e r e n t f r o m the
extradition treaties China has signed
with other foreign countries. The only
question is what are the terms that
should go into a rendition agreement
between Hong Kong and the
Mainland?
Dr Hualing Fu
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,
The University of Hong Kong
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